“. . . NATO has been transforming from its Cold War and then regional incarnation of the 1990s into a transatlantic institution with global missions, global reach, and global partners. This transformation is most evident in Afghanistan where NATO is at work, but the line we’ve crossed is that ‘in area/out of area’ debate that cost so much time to debate in the 1990s is effectively over. There is no ‘in area/out of area.’ Everything is NATO’s area, potentially. That doesn’t mean it’s a global organization. It’s a transatlantic organization, but Article 5 now has global implications. NATO is in the process of developing the capabilities and the political horizons to deal with problems and contingencies around the world. That is a huge change.”1
The process of joining the alliance is governed by Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty and by subsequent agreements. Countries wishing to join have to meet certain requirements and complete a multistep process involving political dialogue and military integration that includes signing numerous defence pacts such as a Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) for Geospatial Cooperation, Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) and Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA).
In 1999, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were added to the organisation. The incorporation of former Warsaw Pact countries has been a cause of increased tension between NATO countries and Russia. Mikhail Gorbachev reportedly agreed to allow German reunification within NATO after being promised that NATO would not expand “one inch to the east.”2 Subsequently, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania and, thereafter, Albania and Croatia joined on 1 April 2009—so much for assurances given by NATO in keeping with their perceived strategic imperatives.
By the turn of the century, NATO had extended up to Asia in the east and southwest and up to North Africa to its south. This coincided with a fundamental change in the strategic thinking in the United States—the senior NATO member’s national security strategy, i.e., the decision to shift the centre of gravity of its security strategy from Europe to Asia.3 The thought process of NATO’s expansion was motivated by the focus of the new American security strategy objectives which had metamorphosed beyond Cold War imperatives.
Consequently, along with the territorial expansion inherent in the growing membership, the mandate of NATO also evolved in keeping with emerging strategic imperatives perceived by the Western alliance. Though not as obvious as the growing membership, this has a major bearing on its current and future conduct with a debilitating effect on global stability and poses new threats to other sovereign powers hitherto unaffected by the Cold War era NATO-Warsaw Pact rivalry.
NATO’s original mandate given at Article 5 of the treaty reads as follows:
“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”4
The geographic parameters for such action are limited by Article 6, which reads:
“For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:
THE ALLIANCE’S TRANSFORMED STRATEGIC CONCEPT
The collapse of communism and the Warsaw Pact led many to question NATO’s continuing relevance. The alliance’s intervention in the Balkans in the 1990s showed that NATO could be used as a force for creating stability even when no member states were under direct threat.6 With its expanded membership and the extraordinary changes in the Euro-Atlantic strategic landscape, the alliance members met in Washington in April 1999 to reevaluate the prevailing strategic concept in support of their common interests. Having noted that the nature of the global strategic environment had undergone “profound political and security developments,” they went about reengineering the NATO mandate and laid down new guidelines to meet the imperatives of a much wider spectrum, i.e., “committed itself to essential new activities in the interest of a wider stability.” Of note is the recognition by the alliance that “The dangers of the Cold war have given way to more promising, but also challenging prospects, to new opportunities and risks.”7 This exercise was an effort to craft a raison d’être to retain NATO and expand its functions even after the evaporation of the threat for which it had been established. To wit “NATO is slated to become a global military force.”8 This thought was further formalised at the NATO Summit in Prague on 21 November 2002 in the declaration issued by the heads of states of the alliance members.9
The new issues brought under the authority of Article 5 of the treaty included the threats posed by terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, the existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the alliance, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, cyber attacks, uncontrolled immigration of large numbers of people, instability in and around the periphery of the alliance, global spread of technology that can facilitate the production of weapons and access to strategic raw materials essential for stability and security of individual or collective members of the alliance.10
Of significance are “the objectives of NATO as a global military alliance to ensure ‘energy security’ of its member states. What this signifies is the militarisation of the world’s arteries, strategic pipeline routes, maritime traffic corridors used by oil tankers, and international waters.”11
Broadly interpreted, this pattern is reminiscent of the beginning of colonialisation by the Europeans in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when they projected military power to corner global resources. The only difference is that the emerging modern version is a collective rather than individual effort by any one state, “with European characters.”
U.S. senator Richard Lugar called for NATO to come to the aid of any member of the military alliance whose energy sources may be threatened. The justification of such an intervention would be under NATO’s mutual defence clause12 Article 5 of the treaty. He is quoted as saying that “[NATO] should recognize that there is little ultimate difference between a member being forced to submit to coercion because of an energy cutoff and a member facing a military blockade or other military demonstration on its borders.”13
Article 5 is the raison d’être of NATO. It construes any attack on one member as an attack on all NATO members. This Article 5 is the basis for the formation of NATO, “mutual defence.” Any interpretation of the clause in regards to energy security would mean that any NATO member whose energy sources are cut off would be able to rely on assistance from the rest of the military alliance. Article 5 could also be interpreted to insinuate that the cutting off of energy to any NATO member would be defined as an act of aggression or an act of war.14
Using this interpretation, invoking one or more of the newly identified “threats” under the authority of Article 5 of the treaty, provides a mandate for the U.S. and its NATO allies to attack energy-producing countries with a view to commandeering their energy and natural resources.
The intent of NATO to expand its mandate to Asia and beyond was first aired publicly in 1996 at the annual seminar held by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), which claims to be “the world’s leading authority on political-military conflict.” At its annual seminar held at Dresden, it propagated NATO enlargement. U.S. and UK experts advocated projecting NATO’s military mantle east to Asia and south to Northern and Eastern Africa, with a view to widen the security envelope to bring these regions under their influence to ensure that they conformed with strategies that would guarantee the national interests of member states of the alliance. On being questioned whether the interests and sovereignty of regional players would be taken into account, these so-called experts glossed over these issues as subservient to the needs of global (Western) stability and security. The roughshod approach suggested that logic was trumped by the belief in U.S. and British infallibility. The very concept of projecting the NATO military umbrella so soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union was challenged by Russia and found unpalatable by delegates from European countries. Delegates from Russia boycotted the seminar, and the Europeans loudly voiced their dissatisfaction with the proposal. Questions on why it was necessary to project Western military power in a region where countries had a meaningful military potential of their own to ensure the security and stability of their region went unanswered.
Thereafter, my second exposure came in 1999–2000, at a time the U.S., the leading light of the transatlantic alliance, had finalised formulating its strategy to shift the centre of gravity of its strategic security policy from Europe to Asia. I had some enlightening engagements with significant luminaries at the State Department, Pentagon, the Department of Energy, the National Security Council and numerous think tanks. All my interlocutors evinced exceptional interest in India’s military potential, its strategic forces, nuclear doctrine and strategy and national interests in the Middle East, Central Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Rim. I was made aware of U.S. intent to shift its strategic focus to Asia and its aspiration to create a “NATO type” alliance of like-minded democratic states in the region that they hoped would include Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia and hopefully India. Most unambiguously stated was Washington’s newly acquired belief that India had emerged as a global player that could be a meaningful ally in the larger U.S. strategic matrix.
NATO IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: AN APPRAISAL
The first decade of the twenty-first century has been witness to a spate of wars invoked by the U.S.-led Atlantic alliance in the name of all recently incorporated threats it has brought under the authority of Article 5 of the treaty. Because of this, the established global security environment has gone into a state of flux.
Consequently, we are witness to:
NATO’s U.S.-initiated invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, which provides a stepping stone to the oil-rich central Asian region, long coveted by the Western powers, in response to the infamous 9/11 Saudi-funded15 al-Qaeda terrorist attack against the U.S.
The invasion and occupation of oil-rich Iraq under the pretext that Saddam Hussein was in violation of the nuclear proliferation regime, to invoke democracy and protection of human rights in the then singularly secular Arab state. Subsequent evidence has belied claims of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, and the construction of permanent military bases suggests ulterior motives.
Even while the first two conflicts remain unresolved, NATO-backed Libyan rebels, many of whom are recognised anti-West terrorists, initiate a military operation to effect a regime change in Libya. The cause of NATO “to shift abruptly from a policy of embracing Gaddafi to launching a brutal scorched-earth invasion of Libya in a matter of months” lies in the popular uprisings that threatened Euro-U.S. domination and their massive investment in Libya’s oil resources. This led to the near total destruction of Libya, yet another secular regime with the highest standard of living in Africa.16
All these military adventures have proven disastrous for the inhabitants of these countries and their surrounding regions; millions have been killed, maimed or rendered homeless; with “rendition,” torture and indiscriminate aerial bombings, human rights have been thrown out of the window; regional security and stability have been emasculated to abnormal proportions and have undermined the economies of the Western powers dangerously, generating a far greater threat to global stability.
Other twenty-first-century conflicts out of the traditional NATO bailiwick in which the U.S. and NATO are covertly or overtly involved are the confrontation with Iran, the Arab-Israel standoff, Somalia, the confrontation with Russia in the Black Sea, and covert initiatives to draw the former Soviet states in the Caucasus into NATO. Yet another looming confrontation that is a prominent blip on the radar is coping with the evolving military potential of a hostile China, which is fast emerging as a major global power.
Russia and her allies perceive the U.S. and NATO’s global missile shield project as a means of commandeering Russian and global energy supplies and natural resources through the threat of force. Russia, like China and Iran, is also being encircled by a military frontier, which it sees as part of the efforts of NATO to surround it and its allies, 17 threatening to destabilise the global security environment dangerously.
All the issues mentioned above have little, if anything, to do with the security of Europe or North America but are a product of NATO’s expansionist aspirations to secure access to global resources in keeping with the interests of member states of the alliance. These initiatives have, however, demonstrated limits of political, economic and military power of the U.S. and its NATO allies. To meet these challenges, NATO needs to expand its mantle to include like-minded power centres in Asia to fulfil the imperatives of a worldwide military alliance.
INDO-U.S. RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Recognising this, the U.S. initiated a policy of rapprochement with India as early as in 1999, leading up to the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, military-to-military cooperation and the on-going strategic dialogue to define the relationship commonly bandied about as an Indo-U.S. strategic alliance.
The U.S., a major stakeholder in NATO, has been pressing India to join three defence pacts that would put it firmly into a strategic military alliance like any of its other NATO partners. These include “Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation (BECA), Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) and Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA),” which are U.S. “arrangements for enhancing defence ties with other countries.”18 The domestic and international implications are far reaching.
BECA comprises an exchange between the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency of the U.S. Department of Defense and its counterpart and client departments in India. It requires both parties to provide “Geospatial Information of any type or format resulting from the information collection, transformation, generation, portrayal, dissemination, or storing of geodetic, geophysical, geomagnetic, aeronautical, topographic, hydrographic, commercial and other unclassified imagery, cartographic, cultural, bathymetric, and toponyrnic data or other types of geospatial information. Geospatial information also includes information resulting from the evaluation of topographic, hydrographic, or aeronautical features for their effect on military operations or intelligence. Geospatial information may include, but is not limited to, presentation in the following forms: topographic, planimetric, relief, or thematic maps or graphics; nautical and aeronautical charts and publications; and commercial and other unclassified imagery, as well as simulated, photographic, digital, or computerized formats”.19 This extremely intrusive interaction would require South Block to make some sensitive compromises entailing its intelligence agencies and the military. In all probability, it would require the Constitution to be amended.
CISMOA is an agreement that lays down protocols for interoperability and ensuring the security of communications between the armed forces of the two countries. It enables each country’s armed forces to carry out joint operations via agreed and secure communications protocols. It is a requirement before the U.S. can transfer sophisticated communications technology to India.20 CISMOA is the concern of the U.S. Pacific commander in chief, who has to certify that equipment that will be used for information gathering and dissemination can also be used “interoperable” by U.S. forces. The Indian military would rightly resist this pact, which permits intrusive control of the entire range of its C4ISR equipment, i.e., command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms—even more so with the United States’ close ties to its major non-NATO ally (MNNA), Pakistan. Inherent in such an arrangement would be a loss of autonomy in executing military operations to defend national security interests in an environment wherein the partners’ interests are at variance.
LSA requires both countries to provide their bases, fuel and other kinds of logistics support to each other’s fighter jets and naval warships. Logistical support with regard to weapons facilities would involve nonoffensive military equipment. This support will involve cashless transactions on a reciprocal basis. It is similar to the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), which the U.S. has with many of its NATO allies.21 However, under the prevailing environment, there is little likelihood that India would require extensive use of such facilities in North America. On the other hand, the U.S., which is involved in a number of military operations in South Asia and its neighbourhood, would be using these bases to transit forces to and from the war zone and for R&R purposes. Furthermore, India’s laws do not allow for free movement without necessary legal papers. Finally, political sensitivities could pose hurdles that the government may not be able to negotiate.
NATO’S CALL FOR ENGAGEMENT WITH INDIA
India’s relationship with NATO is only a part of the larger security matrix that envelopes its security interests and not an end in itself. Over the last six decades, Delhi learned to balance national interests and threats in keeping with its comparatively inadequate power coefficient to ensure an appropriate environment for growth. This was possible only because Jawaharlal Nehru, the first post-independence prime minister, having recognised India’s fragility, was able to relate with the then prevailing global milieu in accordance with the ancient Hindu philosophy as advocated by Kautilya:
“Whoever is inferior to another shall make peace with him; whoever is superior in power shall wage war; whoever thinks ‘no enemy can hurt me, nor am I strong enough to destroy my enemy,’ shall observe neutrality; whoever is possessed of necessary means shall march against his enemy; whoever is devoid of necessary strength to defend himself shall seek the protection of another; whoever thinks that help is necessary to work out an end shall make peace with one and wage war with another. Such is the aspect of the six forms of policy.”22
He elected to follow the path of neutrality under the banner of the non-aligned movement. This philosophy served India well, allowing the best possible environment for multifaceted growth of a fledgling democracy in a highly developed industrial environment. Over five decades, India underwent the trauma induced by its delayed agricultural and industrial revolutions and was at par with the more advanced states in the management of the more sophisticated electronic revolution currently underway. It has developed a significant political, economic, military and technological power base and has emerged on the world scene as a meaningful player. Consequently, it is sought by many to facilitate their interests and yet others who are threatened by its exponential increment in power potential. The two have to be balanced carefully keeping in mind that India’s regional security concerns were of marginal concern to the U.S. and its NATO allies. Though in some respects their agenda converges with India’s scheme of things, it is also aimed at issues that would generate imbalances detrimental to India’s specific security interests.
It is in this context that India must formulate and orchestrate its national security strategy without unbalancing equations with other regional players that feel threatened by its emergence as a global power. In the larger scheme of things, it would be prudent for her not to be seen to be aligning with an external power that aims to reshape the prevailing security matrix.
Keeping this in mind, India must appreciate the changed international milieu and its newly acquired power potential. It can no longer retreat into a shell of procrastination but needs to productively deploy its fast-growing economic power, potent military capacities and extraordinary human resources to exercise her prerogative to secure her sovereignty and national interests through gainful interaction with the full spectrum of global powers in keeping with internationally accepted norms.
NATO wants a deeper engagement with India in fields ranging from counterterrorism and antipiracy to cyber security and ballistic missile defence (BMD). A senior NATO official has suggested that India should shed its Cold War-non-aligned mind-set for greater international security. U.S. permanent representative to NATO Ivo H. Daalder suggests “The dialogue will establish how India and NATO can work together to promote security and tackle new emerging threats.”23 He goes on to advocate a deeper engagement with India in fields ranging from counterterrorism and antipiracy to cyber security and BMD.
This raises a number of questions. Terrorism is essentially a domestic issue that exacerbates the internal security of an individual state. Countering that is tantamount to ensuring good governance to mitigate the frustrations amongst disaffected citizens appropriately supported by stern law and order policies to make militancy an unattractive proposition. Failing this national military means are applied judiciously in keeping with the constitutional mandate. The concept of noninterference by outside powers is integral to resolving domestic problems—be it through military power or through intelligence acquisition.
There are certain exceptions. The more obvious is the glaring example of piracy off the coast of the Horn of Africa and the Malacca Straits. India has provided unreserved support to deal with both by deploying its naval forces to defend ships and crew irrespective of their national affiliations. The other and far more treacherous manifestation is “state-sponsored” terrorism, which is a means of waging a “proxy war” against another state. This is a culpable act of war that opens itself to interstate military cooperation. India has been the target of blatant state-sponsored terrorism authored by Pakistan for the last two-plus decades.24 In the 1990s, NATO countries in particular and the world in general glossed over this heinous behaviour by Pakistan, 25 in which thousands of Indian lives were lost. It suited the West to continue castigating India’s counterterrorism strategy in Kashmir in deference to domestic constituents and to keep India on notice for future strategic intentions of their own. It was not until 2002 that George W. Bush declared war against states responsible for sponsoring terrorism—that too against an assortment of states while excluding Pakistan.26
How does New Delhi engage with NATO in counterterrorism when it differs fundamentally in its definition of “terrorism” and “concept of engagement” that are integral to its national interests and also the initiating state’s raison d’être for such operations? Engagement must, therefore, be limited to those issues where a common ground exists and excluding areas where such action may further destabilise regional security equilibrium.
Cyber security is a critical national vulnerability that exists in the realms of a pervasive “electromagnetic spectrum.” Computer dependency is a universal facet of all fields of governance, making these networks susceptible to crippling virus attacks. Binary access to a secure spectrum and codes increases risks of penetration and could compromises autonomy of action-generating new vulnerabilities in Delhi’s capacity to manage its national security strategy. Considering India falls into the category “existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the alliance,” which the new NATO mandate labels a threat, it continues to be a nonproliferation target under Article 5 of NATO’s current mandate. Combined with demonstrated capabilities to execute crippling cyber attacks to disable Iran’s nuclear programme, 27 New Delhi must be careful that cooperation in cyber security does not extend to hardware or software that may provide widows for access to external forces. Engagement must, therefore, be limited to policy issues without compromising national cyber security means.
The missile threat to Europe and that faced by India emanate from different sources and are of a different nature. NATO disclaimers notwithstanding, the alliance states have revived Russian animosity by their blatant attempts to induce former states of the erstwhile Soviet Union to join NATO. Furthermore, it plans to deploy elements of its BMD systems in ex–Warsaw Pact countries and Georgia, generating the perception that it is directed against Russia. The other threat is from conventionally armed missiles being fielded by Iran. India, on the other hand, has a direct threat from Pakistan (a designated MNNA) and China.
Can New Delhi bank on NATO to participate in an arrangement to secure India against missiles being launched against it during a conflict with Pakistan or China? Or, for that matter, in the event the U.S. initiates a counterproliferation strike against India in support of an ally? Would it be prudent for Delhi to be seen taking sides in the on-going NATO-Russian-American wrangle vis-à-vis BMD? The answer to all three is an emphatic NO.
The efficacy of fielding BMDs is questionable and a waste of resources and effort, be it by the Americans, the Europeans or India. Reliance on satellites for detection and targeting of incoming missiles and precision guidance through radio make BMD systems susceptible to destruction, intrusion and blanketing by antisatellite systems and electronic countermeasure (ECM) operations and exclusion by electromagnetic pulse (EMP) blanketing. The last two are relatively cheap and easy to create.
The Indian strategic community needs to start looking out of the “American Box.” Does it have the resources to develop and deploy an autonomous Indian GPS navigation system to provide guaranteed support for our strategic and conventional weapons inventory, like Russia and China are in the process of doing? Can India guarantee successfully operating such a system during a conflict, which may directly or indirectly affect the national interests of one or more of the major powers? Why has the U.S. been pressuring India to share its BMD development? Those formulating India’s national strategies need to get answers to these and many more critical questions before following the paths marketed by foreign glossies.
In conclusion, I would like to state that for the last six years, India has been engaging Washington in the hope of establishing a strategic alliance between the two. The term “strategic alliance” is in itself an oxymoron. The flexibility of the American function of “alliance” is highly unpredictable, so aptly demonstrated in its application vis-à-vis its “war on terror,” wherein it feels free to bomb Pakistan, which it forcibly co-opted as a partner and which has been granted a MNNA status.
A strategic alliance is an arrangement between two or more countries to collectively achieve specific objectives that conform to defined parameters dictating resources, space and time and is directed to specific states. What then is the objective envisaged for the much-sought-after Indo-U.S. strategic alliance? Or is this to be governed carte blanche in keeping with the revised NATO mandate? In my view, it would be imprudent for India, whose foreign policy has been successfully hinged on the philosophy of neutrality, to stake its national interests on an all-encompassing strategic alliance. This, however, does not preclude it from entering into specific objective-based bilateral arrangements with the U.S. and its NATO allies to achieve legitimate goals in keeping with its nonaligned policy. Two excellent examples exist in India’s commitment to safeguard sea lines of communication through the Malacca Straits and its commitment to facilitate rebuilding Afghanistan’s infrastructure.
In so far as the expansion of NATO is concerned, Delhi needs to take cognisance of possible attempts by the alliance to recreate the colonial regime that provided the wherewithal on which their existing power quotient rests. Peculiarly enough, the much-sought-after “engagement” is directed to strategically sensitive issues, the purpose of which lies exclusively in India having to make certain unnecessary compromises.
Nevertheless, in the evolving global economic milieu, it makes sense for India to establish some “mutually beneficial arrangements” with the U.S. and its NATO partners as it has with Russia. In doing so, South Block needs to ensure that other regional powers that have a direct bearing on India’s national interests, such as China, with whom we are in the process of resolving a major territorial dispute, and Iran, which is a major source for critical oil supplies, do not perceive these initiatives as inimical to their interests.
Notes and References
1. Daniel Fried. “Press Roundtable with NATO Reporting Tour Journalists.” Department of State, Washington, DC, 17 April 2007. <http://prague.usembassy.gov/md704-fried.html>.
2. Bill Bradley. “A Diplomatic Mystery.” Foreign Policy, September/October 2009. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/13/a_diplomatic_mystery>.
3. Steven Kosiak, Andrew Krepinevich and Michael Vickers. “A Strategy for a Long Peace.” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 2001. <http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/2001.01.12-Alternative-Defense-Strategy.pdf>.
4. NATO. “The North Atlantic Treaty.” 4 April 1949. <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm>.
6. Jefferson Chase. “Background: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).” Deutsche Welle, 14 May 2010. <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5562889,00.html>.
7. The Washington Summits. Federation of American Scientists, 22–23 April 1999. <http://www.fas.org/man/nato/natodocs/99042411.htm>.
8. Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya. “The Globalization of Military Power: NATO and the Broader Network of US Sponsored Military Alliances.” Global Research, 18 May 2007.
9. NATO. “Prague Summit Declaration.” Issued by the heads of state and government
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague, 21 November 2002. <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>.
10. Op cit, n. 7 and n. 9.
11. Op cit, n. 8.
12. Vladimir Putin. “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy” (Address, Munich Conference on Security Policy, Munich, Bavaria, 10 February 2007).
13. Judy Dempsey. “U.S. Senator Urges Use of NATO Defense Clause for Energy.” International Herald Tribune, 28 November 2006.
14. Op cit, n. 8.
15. Christopher Boucek. “Terrorism out of Saudi Arabia.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 12 September 2011. <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/12/terrorism-out-of-saudi-arabia/53pw>.
16. James Petras. “NATO’s War Crimes in Libya: Who Grieves for the Fallen Heroes?” The People’s Voice.org, 12 September 2011. <http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2011/09/12/nato-s-war-crimes-in-libya-who-grieves-f>.
17. Op cit, n. 8.
18. Outlook India. “CISMOA, LSA Not on Table of Indo-US Strategic Dialogue.” 15 July 2011. <http://news.outlookindia.com/item.aspx?727872>.
19. U.S. Department of Defense. “Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement Between National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency of the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Norway.” <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/143676.pdf>.
20. South Asian Defense and Strategic Affairs. “US Navy Chief in India on Maiden Visit.” 9 April 2010. <http://www.stratpost.com/us-navy-chief-in-india>.
21. Sameer Suryakant Patil. “Explaining the India-Us Logistics Support Agreement.” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 28 February 2008. <http://www.ipcs.org/article/military/explaining-the-india-us-logistics-support-agreement-2500.html>.
22. R. Shamasastry (translator). Kautilya’s Arthashastra: Book VI, ‘The Source of Sovereign States.’ Bangalore Government Press, 1915. <http://www.american-buddha.com/cult.kautilyaarthashastra6.htm>.
23. Rajat Pandit. “NATO Seeks Greater Engagement with India.” Times of India, 2 September 2011. <http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-09-02/india/30105007_1_india-and-NATO-north-atlantic-treaty-organization-european-led>.
24. B. Raman. “Pakistani Sponsorship of Terrorism.” South Asia Analysis Group, 25 February 2000. <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers2%5Cpaper106.html>.
25. US Department of State. “Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism.” Country Reports on Terrorism, 18 August 2011. <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2010/170260.htm>.
26. “Patterns of Global Terrorism - 2001.” Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 21 May 2002. <http://www.cubanet.org/ref/dis/05210201.htm>.
27. Tom Gjelten. “Security Expert: U.S. ‘Leading Force’ Behind Stuxnet.” NPR, 26 September 2011. <http://www.npr.org/2011/09/26/140789306/security-expert-u-s-leading-force-behind-stuxnet>.